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Abstract. What has come to be known as the poverty penalty–the additional cost paid for goods and services 
by the poor relative to the more afluent–is a familiar mechanism in emerging countries. For profoundly 
 different reasons, however, poor people in developed countries also suffer from the poverty penalty. Quite 
naturally, without any particular ill will on the part of the actors in the commercial sector, the market some-
times penalizes the poor by making them pay more than other households, per unit of consumption, for the 
same goods and services. 
Drawing on a study by the Boston Consulting Group conducted at the request of the action tank “Entreprises 
et Pauvreté”, this paper sets out to quantify a part of the poverty penalty. The economic impact is far from 
incidental, as it represents, at the very least, a “double jeopardy” of an extra 2.5% of the total budget for 
low-income households, or some €500–more than a month’s worth of “discretionary” spending. 
The paper sheds light on the various underlying mechanisms that contribute to the creation of the poverty 
penalty. These “undesirable side-effects” of the market are of ive types:
• An unfavorable cost structure
• An unfavorable price structure
• The law of supply and demand
• A lack of equipment or an unfavorable risk proile
• Insuficient objectivity to deal with scarce, imperfect or missing information.
The ultimate aim is to favor the development of compensation or annulment solutions through “positive 
 discrimination” actions implemented by businesses; experiments currently under way offer some hope in 
the ight against the poverty penalty.
Keywords. Poverty in developed countries, poverty penalty, double jeopardy, social business.
1 The Poverty Penalty in France: How the  
 Market Makes Low-Income Populations Poorer
As numerous studies have shown, poverty cannot be under-
stood as a one-dimensional phenomenon, restricted to inancial 
issues alone. Financial constraints remain, of course, a core 
concern for the poor, but these constraints are aggravated by 
another, perhaps even more unjust, form of pressure. Known as 
the “poverty penalty” or “double jeopardy”, it refers to the fact 
that the poor often pay more per unit of consumption than the 
non-poor. Or as one Washington Post journalist put it, provoca-
tively: “You have to be rich to be poor” (Brown 2009). 
There are few studies that document in any detail the pov-
erty penalty in rich countries. Indeed, as far as we are aware, 
no such study has ever been conducted in France. This paper 
sets out to change that. It is based on a study commissioned 
by the HEC professorial chair in Social Business and the 
 action tank “Entreprise et Pauvreté”, conducted pro bono by 
a team from the Boston Consulting Group’s Paris ofice. 
Using available statistical data, this study focused on seven 
sectors of activity. Its conclusions, as we shall see, are damn-
ing: on average, compared to the rest of the population, poor 
households pay an annual penalty of €500 in the sectors ana-
lyzed: a “double jeopardy” of 2.5%, or even as high 8% for 
1 This research is the result of a collaboration between the “Social 
Business, Enterprise and Poverty” chair at HEC Paris (sponsored 
by Danone and Schneider Electric), the action tank “Entreprise et 
Pauvreté”, and the strategic consulting irm Boston Consulting Group. 
The authors would like to thank David Menascé for his valuable help 
throughout this project.
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certain types of household. This may sound like a lot of mon-
ey, and yet it is only a part of the penalty paid by poorer 
consumers. There are also signiicant penalties in other sec-
tors, which are harder to evaluate; as we argue below, the 
poor are subject to “triple” or even “quadruple” jeopardy. 
This is not to say that the business world has hatched some 
kind of conspiracy against the poor. It is simply that, left to 
their own devices, the market mechanisms that businesses 
have to deal with naturally penalize the poor. This paper 
looks into the idea of introducing a new system of “positive 
discrimination” in business, this time in favor of the poor. 
2 Costing the poverty penalty
The poverty penalty is a relatively well-known phenomenon; it 
was described for the irst time in the United States in 1963 by 
David Caplovitz, in the evocatively titled “The Poor Pay More”. 
In 2004, C.K. Prahalad’s book “The Fortune at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid” provided a striking update for the poor living in 
emerging countries. There are now a number of studies that 
quantify, at least to some extent, the size of the poverty penalty 
in emerging countries, but the phenomenon remains largely un-
recognized in rich countries such as France. And yet the national 
statistical data are there to tell the tale, albeit incompletely.
2.1 A well-known phenomenon affecting  
the poor in emerging countries
Poverty penalties have been widely analyzed in emerging 
countries, probably because they are even more lagrant there 
than in rich countries. In Bombay, for example, Prahalad and 
Hammond (2002) have shown that the inhabitants of Dharavi, 
India’s biggest slum, pay 20% more for their rice than the 
inhabitants of the residential district of Warden Road. 
Depending on the product or service, this double jeopardy 
can rise dramatically, reaching 100% for a minute of tele-
phone use, and prices 10, 37, and up to 75 times higher for 
anti-diarrhea medication, water and credit, respectively.
The water sector provides a good illustration of the phe-
nomenon. For people living in slums, not being connected to 
the water distribution network means that they have to pay 
much more for water of dubious sanitary quality. A World 
Bank study of 47 poor countries evaluated the average mark-
up of water sector intermediaries, showing how the price per 
cubic meter of water shoots up from less than US$ 0.5 when 
purchased from public or private utilities to over $4.5 when 
bought from street vendors (Kariuki and Schwartz 2005).
Poverty penalties in poor countries are in large part attrib-
utable to imperfections in the informal market and the inabil-
ity of the poor to access the same markets as the non-poor, 
due to institutional obstacles (lack of administrative recogni-
tion, or access to conventional banking networks) or physical 
barriers (non–connection to utility grids, rural isolation).
2.2 A little understood, but very widespread, 
phenomenon in France
Paradoxically, although they have no institutional or physical 
obstacles, the poor in rich countries also pay poverty 
penalties. The mechanisms at work may be different, but the 
result is the same: those in poverty are hit with a double jeop-
ardy, in the form of higher prices per unit of consumption.
2.2.1 The irst penalty: the situation  
of the poor in France
2.2.1.1 The traditional measure of poverty in France
The oficial deinition is based on the threshold of 60% of 
median income (i.e. 880 euros a month for a single person), 
below which people can be considered to be poor. In 2009, 
the last year for which the igures are known, 13.5% of the 
French population was concerned, or 8.2 million people 
(INSEE 2011). While the size of that igure may, quite right-
ly, come as a surprise, it nonetheless places France in a favor-
able situation compared with most other European countries, 
as the corresponding igures are, for example, 15% for 
Germany and 19% for the United Kingdom (Eurostat 2010). 
The number of people in poverty is on the increase, however, 
up by more than 750,000 on 2002, when the percentage was 
12.9%. The population groups most exposed to poverty are 
couples with 3 or more children (34%), single-parent families 
(33%), and young people under the age of 24 (19%) (INSEE 
2011). These igures need to be handled with some precau-
tion: as the ONPES report (2010) points out, the statistical 
tools traditionally used for measuring poverty do not always 
accurately relect changes in poverty, mainly because of the 
time lag involved in collecting the data. The deterioration 
measured in 2009, for example, does not seem to take fully 
into account the sudden worsening of the situation reported in 
“ield” observations.
2.2.1.2 Measuring what is “left-to-live-on”:  
 essential, necessary and discretionary spending
A more accurate understanding of poor population groups 
can be gained by analyzing their budgets, separating out the 
irreducible expenses they have to meet. These expenses 
 correspond to items of “essential spending”: rent, taxes, loan 
repayments, compulsory insurance, and utility bills: gas, 
 water, electricity, etc. For poor households (the 1st income 
decile), this igure represents 31% of income. France’s High 
Commission for Active Solidarity against Poverty estimated 
in 2009 that the proportion of essential spending had risen by 
40% between 2001 and 2006 for the poor, whereas the 
 percentage had remained stable for households above the 
poverty line (Hirsch, 2009). 
The money remaining once these expenses have been met–
the “left-to-live-on” amount–is a useful tool for measuring 
the real situation of poor households. It can in turn be subdi-
vided into in necessary spending, discretionary spending, and 
saving capacity. The Boston Consulting Group study propos-
es the following breakdown: “necessary” spending refers to 
food, transportation, communication, health, school lunches, 
education and, inally, inancial services. The rest is classed 
as “discretionary spending”, the main items being: clothing, 
leisure, furniture/equipment, non-mandatory insurance, alco-
hol and tobacco, and, inally, hotels and restaurants. The 
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balance left over when total spending is subtracted from in-
come is called “saving capacity”. 
Using the INSEE igures, and assimilating poor households 
to the 1st income decile, median households to the average of 
the 5th and 6th deciles, and rich households to the 10th decile, 
the breakdown of spending for each proile is indicated in 
Table 1 below.
In other words, once the essential and necessary expenses 
have been met, poor households (with an average of 2.2 peo-
ple) are left with €420 a month to pay for clothes, furniture or 
entertainment. As this amount is insuficient, they fall back 
on borrowing–an average of €110. Clearly, for these house-
holds, the monthly gap between borrowing and saving–for 
“rainy days” or to improve their living conditions–is a matter 
of a few dozen euros either way.
The second penalty has to be seen in this context of almost 
non-existent room for manoeuver, which makes it all the 
more painful. 
2.2.2 The double jeopardy:  
measuring the poverty penalty in France
2.2.2.1 The BCG study of February 2011
Although studies have been conducted in certain speciic sec-
tors–for example, the 2008 ADEME study on energy con-
sumption–there was no pre-existing research, as far as we are 
aware, to evaluate the poverty penalty in France across the 
board. The BCG study set out to do just that. The analysis 
focused on seven key items of “essential and necessary” 
spending: housing, food, transportation, insurance, credit, 
communication and health (see box for the methodology). 
The study deliberately restricted itself to analyzing quantita-
tive data from INSEE, in order to illustrate the double jeop-
ardy in the most factual way possible. As we shall see, these 
methodological choices lead us to believe that the indings of 
this study should be seen as a lower-end estimate of the dou-
ble jeopardy for poor households. 
While this analysis does not ind evidence for a double 
jeopardy in “food” and “transportation” spending, it does 
quantify the associated double jeopardy on the ive other 
items. The main conclusions are summarized in Table 2 be-
low. The additional cost ranges from 3% (insurance) to 20% 
(consumer loans and health). Relative to the total expenditure 
Table 1. Distribution of spending by income
Poor households Median households Rich households
Essential & necessary spending € 11,994
(70%)
€ 19,994
(50%)
€ 39,710
(33%)
Discretionary spending € 6,378
(37%)
€ 12,406
(31%)
€ 31,701
(26%)
Saving capacity € -1,343
(-8%)
€ 7616
(19%)
€ 50,603
(41%)
Total income € 17,029 € 39,966 € 122,014
Source: BCG study “Double Peine” for the action tank “ Entreprises et Pauvreté” February 2011; INSEE data
Methodology of the Boston  
Consulting Group Study 
The study conducted by the BCG draws on the latest ma-
jor detailed survey from INSEE on household income 
and consumption in France, published in 2008.
The BCG began by analyzing the budgets of poor 
households, broken down into basic items of expendi-
ture, and then selected the expenditure items most rele-
vant to the analysis of the poverty penalty due to their 
signiicance for the budgets of poor households and their 
“double jeopardy” potential.
The next step was to evaluate the gap between unit 
prices in a selection of categories. Drawing on the de-
tailed analysis of spending, a unit purchase price was 
calculated for each category and compared with the price 
paid by the median consumer, based on quantities con-
sumed (e.g. rent/surface area), the price/volume curve 
(e.g. for energy) or a typical spending basket (e.g. food, 
health). These calculations were used to synthesize the 
“double jeopardy” effect for a poor household.
The factors that account for the double jeopardy were 
then analyzed. Before summarizing the data and prob-
ing, for each spending category, the levers that could be 
explored by business, the authors of the study examined 
the existing compensatory mechanisms and their trigger-
ing thresholds (aid in the form of state welfare payments, 
such as housing support, or of social beneits in kind, 
such as universal supplementary insurance cover, access 
to social rented housing, and social tariffs).
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of poor households, the double jeopardies identiied represent 
a premium of 2.5%, or about €500 in additional annual spend-
ing: equivalent to more than a month and a half of discretion-
ary spending. Expressed on a national scale, the annual cost 
of the double jeopardy for the 3.5 million poor households 
comes to almost 2 billion euros.
It is important to remember that these igures are averages, 
obtained by analyzing statistical aggregates. For a fuller, more 
tangible, understanding of the extent of the double jeopardy, 
the BCG study also offers an interesting comparison between 
three families in typical conigurations: a family on a median 
income and two families living in poverty (one of them own-
ing its own home, the other renting). Table 3 highlights the cost 
differences per unit of consumption  between median house-
holds and poor households, and the double jeopardy for each 
spending category. In the conigurations considered, the annual 
cost of the double jeopardy totals €1025 for the tenant family 
and €1139 for the home-owning family. In either case, this 
represents more than 5% of household income and the equiv-
alent of more than two and a half months of discretionary 
spending. In reality, poor households soon reach a double 
jeopardy of 8% of income.
2.2.2.2 Towards a deinition of “triple”  
 and “quadruple” penalties? 
The BCG study is rich in insights, and its quantiied ind-
ings are already highly signiicant. And yet, by its design, the 
study minimizes the amplitude of the double jeopardy. On the 
one hand, the set of sectors analyzed covers only 2/3 of the 
total consumption of poor population groups. Extending it to 
all of the goods and services consumed by poor households 
would logically lead to a concomitant increase in the body of 
data adduced. On the other hand, the method focuses on sta-
tistically attested double jeopardy; the study does not detect a 
double jeopardy either in food or transportation, categories 
which nonetheless represent 15.4% and 9.4% respectively of 
total consumption by poor households. Does this mean that 
there is no double jeopardy in these two categories? That 
seems unlikely. 
For food, the double jeopardy is expressed, for example, 
in the inferior nutritional quality of “low-end” foodstuffs. 
This inferior nutritional quality can have signiicant 
health consequences, because the food is in principle of 
lower quality, or because greater quantities have to be 
 purchased, and ingested, for the same nutrient and vitamin 
intake. For transportation, the question of the double jeop-
ardy arises directly when carmakers practice cutthroat 
competition on the price of new cars and keep their dealer-
ships aloat by pushing up their margins on used vehicles, 
or when the cost of the technical inspection and the obliga-
tory repairs that follow is borne disproportionately by the 
poorest households. 
In either case, one could speak of a “triple penalty” when 
discussing the inferior quality of the goods purchased (in 
food, for example, but also in other categories such as domes-
tic appliances) or the induced additional functioning costs 
(for transportation, for example, but other categories, such as 
heating for poorly insulated houses could also be cited). 
Admittedly, these additional costs could be integrated into 
the double jeopardy, but their indirect and often unpredict-
able nature argues for a separate conceptualization. Evaluating 
this “triple penalty” would call for an altogether more oner-
ous methodology, notably with longitudinal monitoring of a 
panel of poor households.
Finally, it may be legitimate to speak of a “quadruple pen-
alty” when one considers that exposure to the media–espe-
cially television–is far higher among the poor than among 
more afluent groups. An INSEE study on the consumption 
of TV programs clearly shows that the least afluent socio- 
economic groups (manual workers, non-manual workers, 
pensioners) watch more television than mid-level occupa-
tions, middle managers, and senior managers and profes-
sionals (INSEE 2005): 51% of non-manual workers, 61% of 
manual workers and 73% of pensioners watch more than two 
hours of television a day, whereas these igures fall to 43% 
for mid-level occupations and 27% for middle managers and 
for senior managers and professionals. The consequence of 
over-exposure to television is clear: poor households are the 
irst victims of a frustration effect, bombarded with the new 
Table 2. Quantiication of the double jeopardy.
Share of poor 
household spending
Average double 
jeopardy
Main cause of the double jeopardy (DJ)
Rent 12.8% 8% DJ concentrated on private tenants (+15%)
Utilities 9.1% 5% DJ on collective charges (+16%) and domestic gas (+6%)
Insurance 6.3% 3% DJ on home insurance (+20%)
Credit 4.4% 20% Use of consumer credit
Communication 4.0% 7% Use of pre-paid cards
Health 2.6% 20% Lower supplementary cover
Source: BCG study “Double Peine” for the action tank “ Entreprises et Pauvreté” February 2011
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goods and services showcased every day by the media. This 
psychological quadruple penalty is hard to quantify, but it is 
nonetheless real.
3 The mechanisms behind the poverty penalty
The debate about the impact of the market on the situation of 
people in poverty all too often boils down to a clash of ideo-
logical positions: for some, the market tramples on the right 
to dignity of vulnerable people, while for others it enables 
everyone to fulill his or her individual potential. Ideology 
aside, the study of the double jeopardy sheds light on a “natu-
ral” mechanism of the market: without calculation or ill will, 
the market has undesirable side effects. It effectively penal-
izes people in poverty. Poverty penalties can be analyzed as a 
collateral result of designing offerings of goods and services 
for the median population or more afluent classes. This phe-
nomenon can be attributed mainly to ive factors. Three of 
these involve the double jeopardy observed when people in 
poverty buy the same goods or use the same services as the 
non-poor; the other two derive from the fact that they con-
sume different products, or consume the same products in 
different ways.
3.1 Double jeopardy for the same product  
and the same usage
3.1.1 An unfavorable cost structure 
The irst factor is the cost structure, which is unfavorable to 
small-quantity purchases, since the unit cost of certain goods 
or services produced in small quantities is higher for the busi-
ness. Poor households, which mainly buy things in small 
quantities, are therefore directly penalized. This is the case, 
for example, with inancial services, where the ixed admin-
istration costs have a strong impact on the overall interest rate 
for loans of small amounts. 
3.1.2 An unfavorable price structure 
The second factor is an unfavorable price structure. In this 
case, the cost to the business of producing the product or 
 service does not change, but the way it is priced negatively 
impacts the purchasing cost for the poor. Home insurance, for 
example, works out more expensive per room, or per euro 
insured, when small volumes are involved. Being generally 
smaller than average, the homes of poor households therefore 
incur a double jeopardy on their insurance of +20% per 
square meter.
The distinction between unfavorable cost structure and 
unfavorable price structure is an important one. In the irst 
case, the business simply passes the additional cost on to 
poorer consumers. In the second, it could be accused, at 
the very least, of negligence towards the underprivileged. 
However, it is not always easy to make an a priori distinction 
between an unfavorable cost structure and an unfavorable 
price structure. Mobile telephony is a case in point: being 
unable to afford a subscription, with its high face value and 
long-term commitment, poor households tend to opt for pre-
paid cards, which cost more to put on the market (notably 
because of the distribution network involved). A minute of 
talk time is billed 15 to 50% higher for prepaid cards than for 
subscriptions. What proportion of this additional charge is 
due to the difference in cost to the operator? Only a detailed 
analysis of the sector, and indeed of each operator, could pro-
vide a precise answer to that question.
3.1.3 The law of supply and demand
Sometimes the law of supply and demand puts upward pres-
sure on the prices of goods and services consumed in small 
quantities, the market being tighter when volumes are small. 
Of course, as economic theory tells us, the differences should 
even out in the long term. But the reality is sometimes differ-
ent, and the housing market provides a perfect illustration: 
Table 3. Cost per unit of consumption
Median households Poor households % double jeopardy
Rent € 45 / m² € 52 / m² 15.6
Utilities € 0.44 / m² € 0.51 / m² 13.7
Domestic gas € 84.9 / MWh € 89.6 / MWh 5.6
Home insurance € 80 / room € 96 / room 20.0
Property loans € 96 / m² € 107 / m² 11.5
Consumer loans € 1041 / n goods € 1374 / same goods 32.0
Mobile telephone € 15 / hour € 19 / hour 26.7
Health € 389 / n treatments € 486 / same treatments 24.9
Source: BCG study “Double Peine” for the action tank “Entreprises et Pauvreté” February 2011
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small dwellings are traditionally more sought after, and this is 
relected in the price. The purchasing price per square meter 
is on average 5% higher for poorer households. Two addi-
tional factors push the cost up even further: irstly, mortgage 
rates are less advantageous for poor borrowers, who have 
little to bargain with: the difference can be as much as 3 per-
centage points. Secondly, poor households tend to be passed 
over for the best-value offerings in the private rental market 
because of their higher risk proile: the corresponding addi-
tional cost is in the order of 10%. 
3.2 Different products,  
or different ways of consuming
3.2.1 Lack of access to special offers
Poor households do not always have access to the best offers, 
because they do not have the necessary equipment, or because 
they have the wrong risk proile, or because the upfront price 
is dissuasive. For example, lack of access to the Internet dis-
criminates against the poor in as much as online telephone 
operators offer prices 30% lower than conventional operators. 
Likewise, having eficient appliances, or an apartment with 
high-quality insulation, allows for substantial energy savings.
3.1.2 Lack of access to information
Finally, poorer consumers sometimes lack the necessary 
objectivity to handle or decipher complex and at times 
opaque information. This often leads them to make poor 
trade-offs, notably between purchase costs and running 
costs. Who can say with certainty that buying a major-
brand tire saves money in the long run because it lasts lon-
ger and is fuel- eficient? And there is rarely anything in the 
wording of special offers about the longer-term impact of a 
purchase on the household budget.
4 Combating the double jeopardy:  
 possible solutions 
Compensatory mechanisms (inancial assistance, social ser-
vices, reduced tariffs) are in place that reduce budget con-
straints and therefore, indirectly, the double jeopardy that 
poverty generates. However, not all poor households beneit 
from these aids, and it might be worth considering the imple-
mentation of speciic mechanisms to combat the double 
jeopardy. After all, the double jeopardy is a market effect, 
and could therefore be corrected, at least in part, by com-
mercial sector players. Could we not devise a system of “pos-
itive discrimination”, this time in favor of poor consumers? 
Businesses could put in place innovative solutions to pro-
vide the irst building-block of “economic justice”, namely 
the abolition of the double jeopardy. In association with the 
“Social Business” chair at HEC, the action tank “Entreprises 
et Pauvreté” is a non-proit organization that campaigns for 
the implementation of innovative business solutions to com-
bat poverty. It is currently working to deine concrete opera-
tional strategies that businesses can leverage to correct the 
poverty penalty. 
Where the cost structure is unfavorable, the action tank 
suggests restructuring the offering via a “low-cost” approach 
for small quantities. If it is the price structure that is unfavor-
able, the pricing policy can be adjusted so as to obtain the 
same level of proit margin, over and above the direct cost per 
unit of consumption, for all customers. In the energy sector, 
businesses could, for example, act on their billing systems 
(subscriptions). With regard to the law of supply and demand, 
it would be useful to participate in designing an alternative, 
complementary offering; businesses could apply this recom-
mendation, for example, to the housing and rental market, in 
order to align the offering with the modes of consumption of 
poorer households.
There are two levers for addressing the problems of lack of 
equipment or of bad risk proiles. The irst is to rethink the 
offering so as to facilitate access for inancially fragile house-
holds, for example by creating commitment-free telephony 
packages. The second is to put in place a support system to 
help people meet the acceptance conditions, along the lines of 
the guarantee systems required to obtain credit. Where there 
is insuficient objectivity to handle complex information, the 
key lies in clearer, easily accessible information, and perhaps 
dedicated assistance where necessary. Businesses could, for 
example, set up a program to help poorer consumers choose 
a telephony package or a loan that truly corresponds to their 
needs and resources.
The concrete application of these solutions has already be-
gun, with the launch of three experimental projects to combat 
poverty and its “double jeopardy”, in coordination with 
Entreprises et Pauvreté. 
• “Optique Solidaire” is an experiment conducted by 
leading spectacle lens manufacturer Essilor aimed at 
reducing the excess fee for progressive glasses for 
over-60s whose incomes disqualify them from France’s 
universal health cover scheme (CMU). The pilot proj-
ect is starting in Marseille. Between 100,000 and 
120,000 people in France are potentially concerned;
• “Telephonie Solidaire”, is an experimental project led 
by Emmaüs Déi with telephone operator SFR in Paris. 
It seeks to reduce the cost of telephony for people in 
inancial dificulty through the use of low-cost prepaid 
cards and guidance in choosing the right package for 
their needs and resources;
• “Programme Malin” is an experiment implemented by 
baby food manufacturer Bledina and the Red Cross, de-
signed to enable mothers living below the poverty line 
to beneit from special prices for infant formula.
These experiments work on the “Social Business” princi-
ple developed by 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor 
Muhammad Yunus (Yunus 2007). They are clearly still at 
the startup stage, and their innovative character means that 
success is far from guaranteed. However, they represent a 
remarkable step in the right direction. We call upon busi-
nesses everywhere to participate in initiatives such as these.
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Conclusion
At a time when public policies are under severe budget con-
straints, and when labor costs cannot be increased for fear of 
harming business competitiveness, a new awareness of pov-
erty penalties (“double”, “triple” and “quadruple” penalties) 
will enable us to identify levers that are both legitimate, in 
terms of social justice, and eficient, in economic terms, for 
combating poverty in France. 
The end objective is clear: to put in place mechanisms 
capable of reducing poverty penalties, in every economic 
sector, by addressing their characteristics and root causes.
Initiatives are already in place, mobilizing businesses, 
public institutions and non-proit organizations to implement 
innovative solutions. They prove that nothing is written in 
stone, even in these times of crisis, and that a precise, quanti-
ied analysis of underlying causes can lead to the deinition 
of targeted strategies. 
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